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check and the right to receive payment, while drawer Savings Bank has a duty
to pay the check upon presentment. Neither of the contractual relationships con-
cerns the underlying sales contract concluded between Miss Kuebler and the
payee. Certified checks bear a similar characteristic: the bank becomes a party to
the certification with the drawer, payee, or holder,24 but not a party to the
underlying transaction between drawer and payee. The Uniform Commercial
Code implies that there is no right to stop payment on a check that has been
certified.25 However, neither the Code nor the common law explicitly states that
there is no stop payment on a teller's check. In the instant case, stop payment
on the teller's check was not permitted because the drawer Savings Bank accepted
the check when issued and thereby acquired a sole primary obligation without
regard to any underlying sales transaction. Moreover, since a check is a draft
drawn on a bank,26 section 3-118(a) of the Code further supports a primary
obligation theory. "... . A draft drawn on the drawer is effective as a note." 27 The
drawer Savings Bank has accepted the check (draft) at the time of issuance.
Hence, the teller's check is constructively drawn on the drawer Savings Bank,28
and the teller's check is effective as a note. Drawer Savings Bank as maker of a
note has a primary liability on the instrument.29 The court should have based
its decision more on the true nature of a teller's check and a primary obligation
theory than on a policy standpoint of protecting payees.
MARSHALL L. COHEN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LoCAL LAW SETTING RESIDENCE REQUIRE-
M ENTS FOR LOCAL POLICE OFFICERS INVALID AS CONFLICTING WITH VALID
STATE STATUTE
The New York Public Officers Law states that all policemen in New York
State are exempt from local residence requirements if they were appointed prior
to July 1, 1961, and live in the county in which they work, provided that the
police force of which the officer is a member consists of less than two hundred
full-time members.' In October of 1964, the City of Peekskill passed a local law
requiring all police officers employed within that city to live within the city
limits.2 The City of Peekskill contains less than two hundred full-time policemen.
Three policemen in the City of Peekskill, who were appointed prior to July 1,
24. See Carnegie Trust Co. v. First Natl Bank, 213 N.Y. 307, 107 N.E. 695 (1915).
25. See supra note 16.
26. N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-104(2) (b).
27. N.Y. U.C.C. § 3-118(a).
28. The teller's check would have been drawn on the drawer Savings Bank except for
the fact that savings banks in New York are not permitted to maintain checking accounts.
See supra note 8.
29. See 1 H-awkland, Transactional Guide to the Uniform Commercial Code 478 (1964).
1. N.Y. Pub. Officers Law § 30 (Supp. 1965).
2. City of Peekskill, Local Law No. 3 (1964).
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1961, brought an article 78 proceeding in the Supreme Court, Westchester
County, to declare this local law invalid on the ground that it conflicted with the
N.Y. Public Officers Law. The City of Peekskill defended the validity of its
local law on the ground that the state statute was an unconstitutional special law
relating to the property, affairs or government of a local municipality. Held, the
state statute is a valid general law, therefore the local law must fail as inconsis-
tent with a valid, prior state law. Hesselgrave v. King, 45 Misc. 2d 256, 256
N.Y.S.2d 753 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
Since colonial times the cities, towns and villages in New York State have
been striving for that degree of autonomy which would allow local governments
to control their own affairs without interference from the state legislature.-
This quest for "home rule" on the part of local governments has met with oppo-
sition from both the legislative and judicial branches of the state government.
4
An important victory for "home rule" advocates over this opposition came in
1894 with the adoption of article twelve of the New York State Constitution.
This amendment provided that laws relating to the property, affairs or govern-
ment of cities be divided into special and general laws. Special laws were those
laws which applied to one city or less than all in a class; such laws had to be
submitted to the mayor of the city affected for his approval or veto.6 Due to
judicial zeal to protect the legislature's power from local infringement this
amendment was rendered powerless. When a state law was attacked as a special
law, and therefore subject to approval by the mayor of the city affected, a court
would evade this requirement in one of two ways. It would find that the state
law under attack was either general in application and therefore not subject to
the restrictions of special laws 7 or it would find that the law in question dealt with
a matter of state concern such as health or safety and therefore did not require
the mayor's approval.8 During this period of judicial adversity to "home rule"
the legislature began to reshape its attitude toward local governments. Many
laws which would have been classified as general laws by the courts were sub-
3. N.Y. Const. art. xxix (1777) (election of local officers); N.Y. Const. art. 111, § 20
(1821) (two thirds vote of legislature required to appropriate local funds or property) ; N.Y.
Const. art. 111, § 16 (1846) (imposing restrictions on legislature's power to pass local or
private bills) ; N.Y. Const. art. 111, § 18 (1874) (prohibited legislature from passing special
laws on certain subjects).
4. The executive branch has historically been sympathetic to home rule advocates. "In
many such instances the governors even vetoed legislation relating to matters which have
since become recognized as . . . 'matters of state concern.'" Richland, Constitutional City
Home Rule in New York, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 311, 319 (1954).
5. N.Y. Const. art. XII, § 2 (1894). See McBain, Law and Practice of Municipal Home
Rule, 101-06 (1916).
6. If the mayor of the affected city exercised his suspensive veto, the legislature could
override the veto by repassage of the bill by a majority vote. N.Y. Const. art. XII, § 2-
(1894).
7. Matter of McAneny v. Board of Estimate, 232 N.Y. 377, 134 N.E. 187 (1922)
(Rapid Transit Law); Brooklyn City R.R. v. Whalen, 229 N.Y. 570, 128 N.E. 215, affirming
191 App. Div. 737, 182 N.Y. Supp. 283 (2d Dep't 1920) (bus system); McGrath v. Grout,.
171 N.Y. 7, 63 N.E. 547 (1902) (Sheriff's Salary); People ex rel. Hobach v. Sheriff, 13 Misc.
587, 35 N.Y. Supp. 19 (Sup. Ct. 1895) (Regulation of Barbers).
8. People ex rel. Einsfeld v. Murray, 149 N.Y. 367, 44 N.E. 146 (1896).
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mitted to local governments for approval.0 Prompted by this change in legisla-
tive position the Home Rule Amendment of 1923 was adopted. 10 In an obvious
effort to curb judicial restriction of "home rule" the amendment redefined special
laws as those which were special in "terms or effect"; therefore, the courts
could no longer call a statute general simply because it was not aimed at one
particular city as it had done in the past. In addition, the amendment of 1923
gave local governments power to legislate in nine specific subjects.1 1 Further-
more, in 1928, the legislature gave to the cities the power to legislate in their own
property, affairs or government in addition to the nine specific categories.
12
The great strides that the "Home Rule" movement had made in the legis-
lature since 1923, came to a shattering halt in 1929. In that year the State
Legislature passed a municipal dwelling law.13 New York City attacked the law
as an unconstitutional special law on the ground that it was special in "terms or
effect" because it applied to the property, affairs or government of one city (it
applied only to cities with over 800,000 population-in effect, New York City).
In the landmark decision of Adler v. Deegan the statute was upheld as a gen-
eral statute.14 The Court of Appeals, when construing the phrase "property,
affairs or government of cities," used pre-1923 cases and refused to be influenced
by all that had transpired in the legislature since 1923. The Court expressly
stated that "when the people put these words in . . .the Constitution, they
put them there with a Court of Appeals' definition, not that of Webster's Dic-
tionary.' 15 The second ground used to uphold this statute was the doctrine of
State concern, which had been formulated in an earlier case. 10 Under this doc-
trine the state legislature has the power to pass any kind of law, even an other-
wise "special law" as long as it relates to a matter of substantial state concern.
After the decision in the Adler case17 the legislature made one more attempt to
curb the restrictive interpretation which the courts were placing on the home
rule movement. This came in the form of an amendment to the New York
Constitution in 1938 which granted to the cities the legislative power over their
9. Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 311,
325-327 (1954).
10. N.Y. Const. art. XII, § 2 (1894) (Amended 1923).
11. The nine subjects were: matters relating to the officers and employees of a city,
the transaction of its business, incurring obligations, matters relating to claims against a
city, the hours of work and safety of employees of its contractors and subcontractors, matters
relating to city streets and property, regulating the conduct of its inhabitants, the protection
of the property, and the protection of the safety and health of its inhabitants.
12. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1928, ch. 670. The necessity of this enactment was shown by
Browne v. City of New York, 241 N.Y. 96, 149 N.E. 211 (1925). There it was held that the
City of New York could not acquire a bus system because this did not come within the nine
specified categories. The State, on the other hand, could not legislate in this area because that
would be an unconstitutional special law.
13. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 713.
14. 251 N.Y. 467, 167 N.E. 705 (1929), 39 Yale L.J. 92.
15. Id. at 473, 167 N.E. at 707.
16. City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. 429, 443, 165 N.E. 836, 840
(1929).
17. Adler v. Deegan, 251 N.Y. 467, 478, 167 N.E. 705, 710 (1929).
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own property, affairs and government. 18 This power had been granted to the
cities previously only by a statute.39 The courts, however, have continued to
impose restrictions upon legislative enactments in this area of "home rule" and
have continued to give very confusing interpretation to the phrase "local prop-
erty, affairs and government" as well as the scope of the phrase "state con-
cern. °20 This course of action on the part of the judiciary has lead to outcries
and pleas for judicial leniency in this area of "home rule" from many prominent
writers in the area.
21
Prompted by the obvious need for a change in this area of Home Rule,
article nine of the State Constitution was amended and went into effect on
January 1, 1964.22 Under this new Amendment the State Legislature is still
empowered to enact general laws relating to local property, affairs and govern-
ment.2 3 However, at the same time their power is intended to be limited. The
first limitation is express. If municipalities are given a grant of power in the
Statute of Local Governments, 24 the state legislature cannot restrict or withdraw
this power, even by a general law.25 The second limitation is implied from the
rejection by the amendment of the old ̂ concept that local governments are agen-
cies of the state and that they derive all their power from the state.26 The
rejection of this old concept is to be found in two sections of the new amend-
ment. First, the construction clause states that "rights, powers, privileges and
immunities granted to local governments by this article should be liberally con-
strued." 27 Secondly, it is the stated purpose of this amendment to provide for
effective local self-government and intergovernmental cooperation. 28 In addition
to this limited power to pass general laws affecting the property, affairs or gov-
ernment of municipalities the state also has the authority to pass special laws
affecting these local areas provided that the special law deals with a matter of
state concern.29 While many of the provisions of the new amendment are re-
statements of past home rule provisions, different language as well as language
18. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 12. For a discussion of the further events at the 1938 Consti-
tutional Convention see Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York: II, 55
Colum. L. Rev. 598, 605-08 (1955).
19. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1928, ch. 670.
20. See, e.g., Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 6 N.Y.2d 168, 160 N.E.2d 443, 189 N.Y.S.2d
129 (1959); Whalen v. Wagner, 4 N.Y.2d 575, 152 N.E.2d 54, 176 N.Y.S.2d 616 (1958);
Ainslee v. Lounsberry, 275 App. Div. 729, 86 N.Y.S.2d 857 (3d Dep't 1949).
21. McGoldrich, The Law and the Practice of Municipal Home Rule 310-12 (1933);
Mott, Home Rule for American Cities 51 (1949); Council of State Governments, State-Local
Relations 170 (1949).
22. N.Y. Const. art. IX, (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964).
23. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(a)(2) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964). See Shapiro,
Powers of the Legislature 16-19 (1963 Municipal Law Seminar).
24. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1964 ch. 205.
25. Such a grant of local power can only be restricted or withdrawn by the use of
certain procedures specified in § 2, Subd. (b) (1) of the 1964 amendment.
26. 1 Dillon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations § 237 (5th ed. 1911).
This has commonly been referred to as the "Dillon Rule."
27. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 3(c) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964).
28. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 1 (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964).
29. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(b)(2)(c); 3(a)(3).
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of qualification is used to express these old ideas. This fact together with the
stated purpose of the amendment and the section calling for a liberal construc-
tion has lead to speculation that the courts will now yield to the purpose of the
legislature and the mandate of the people who ratified this amendment to allow
local government more autonomy in administering their own local "property,
affairs or government." 30
In the instant case the court proceeds on the basic assumption that once it
is established that there is a state statute general in nature, which relates to the
property, affairs or government of a particular city, any local law which con-
flicts with this general statute must fail as being unconstitutional.3 1 The court
then goes on to hold that since the classification of towns based on population
was reasonable and this statute did apply to all in the class, the public officers
law in question is not a special law but rather a general law and therefore con-
stitutional.32 Accordingly, the local law must be declared invalid since it con-
flicts with a valid state law on the same subject. The court also was of the
opinion that the state statute under attack dealt with a matter of state con-
cern.33 There was no further discussion of the issue. No mention is made of the
constitutional amendment of 1964 which was in effect at this time and also in
effect prior to the enactment of the local law under attack.
The approach taken by the court in the instant case poses a number of
interesting problems to be considered. First, when determining whether the state
law in the instant case was general in nature the court uses the test enunciated
in Farrington v. Pinckney.34 Under this test the law in question need not apply
to all cities to be general but rather it need only apply to all cities in a class.
A general law is defined by the 1964 Amendment as "A law which in terms and
in effect applies, alike to all counties, ...all cities, all towns or all villages."3 3
Nowhere in this definition is there any allusion to classes of cities or towns or
villages. It is therefore questionable whether the Farrington test is consistent
with the plain language of the Constitution. One possible answer to this is that
the Court in Farrington v. PinckneyM6 was applying a liberal interpretation to
the phrase "all cities." The problem with this answer is that the 1964 Amend-
ment only calls for a liberal construction when interpreting the "rights, powers,
privileges and immunities granted to local governments by the article .... ),37
It could be implied from this that the rest of the Constitutional Amendment
should be strictly construed and therefore the Farrington test is no longer
justified under the 1964 Amendment, which would mean that state statutes
30. For a thorough discussion of the recent Amendment and its effect on Home Rule in
general see Home Rule: A Fresh Start, 14 Buffalo L. Rev. 484 (1965).
31. Instant case at 258, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
32. Instant case at 258, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
33. Ibid.
34. 1 N.Y.2d 74, 80, 133 N.E.2d 817, 822, 150 N.Y.S.2d 585, 593 (1956).
35. N.Y. Const. art. ix, § 3(d)(1) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964).
36. 1 N.Y.2d 74, 80, 133 N.E.2d 817, 822, 150 N.Y.S.2d 585, 593 (1956).
37. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 3(c) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964).
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applying to all cities in a class rather than all cities in the state would be special
rather than general laws. Since it would now be a special law relating to the
property, affairs or government of a municipality it would be invalid unless
passed upon the request of two-thirds of the legislative body of the municipality
or on request of the mayor of the municipality and concurred in by a majority
of the local legislature or in the case of the City of New York, upon an emergency
request of the governor and concurred in by two-thirds of the members of the
state legislature.38 Even if the special law were valid according to one of the
above procedures, a local government could still enact a law inconsistent with
the special law provided that the local law dealt with one of ten subjects enumer-
ated in the 1964 Amendment.3
9
The second problem posed is that the 1964 Amendment gives to the state
legislature the power to pass general laws relating to the property, affairs or
government of local municipalities. The problem involved here is whether or not
this power to pass such general laws is limited. The court in the instant case, as
well as the court in Wholesale Laundry Board of Trade v. City of New York,
40
seems to be of the opinion that this state power is unlimited. Both courts take
the approach that once it is established that the state statute is general in nature,
any local law inconsistent with the state law is invalid per se. It is arguable that
the clause of the amendment calling for a liberal construction when construing
powers granted to local governments41 demands that powers given to the state
government be construed narrowly; therefore, there should be some limitation
placed upon the state power to pass such general laws. In addition, the only way
to give effect to the stated purpose of the amendment, which is to provide for
effective local self-government, 42 is to place some limitation on the power of the
state to pass general laws relating to the property, affairs or government of
municipalities. If it is determined that the power of the state in this area should
be limited, the next question is what should this limitation be? Perhaps one
answer would be to limit the power of the state to pass general laws dealing
with local affairs only where the cities have failed to act effectively or where
there is a matter of concern to the entire state involved.
The third and probably most perplexing problem posed by the instant case
is the scope of the phrase "state concern." When a particular area is classified
as a matter of state concern, for example Civil Service,4 3 does this mean that all
aspects of this area are likewise matters of state concern? Caparco v. Kaplan44
answers this question in the negative. In that case it was held that even
38. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § (b)(2) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964).
39. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(b)(3)(c) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964).
40. 43 Misc. 2d 816, 252 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
41. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 3(c) (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964).
42. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 1 (1938) as amended (Supp. 1964).
43. See Matter of Meenagh v. Dewey, 286 N.Y. 292, 36 N.E.2d 211 (1941); Matter of
Friedman v. Finegan, 268 N.Y. 93, 196 N.E. 755 (1935); cf. Caparco v. Kaplan, 20 A.D.2d
212, 245 N.Y.S.2d 837 (4th Dep't 1964).
44. 20 A.D.2d 212, 245 N.Y.S.2d 837 (4th Dep't 1964).
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though Civil Service was a matter of state concern, the administration of
civil service was not. The administration of civil service is a matter of local
concern and came within the definition of local property, affairs or government. 45
This approach would seem to be consistent with the letter and the spirit of the
1964 Amendment. In analyzing the approach taken by the court in the instant
case toward the question of state concern, two flaws appear. First, fire protec-
tion has been held to be a matter of local affairs rather than state concern.40
Although there is no direct holding classifying police protection as a matter of
local affair, there are many decisions holding certain aspects of the police de-
partment, such as wages, hours of work, pension plans, as being matters related
to the property, affairs or government of local municipalities. 47 This prior case
law makes the holding of the court in the instant case rather weak when it states
that the state law setting the residency requirements of police officers is dealing
with a matter of state concern. The second flaw of the court's opinion in the
instant case is that even if this area (police protection) could be considered a
matter of state concern, the reasoning of the Caparco case would justify a
holding that the particular area involved (residency requirements) was a matter
of local concern. The specific area involved rather than the general subject
matter is determinative. These are just a few of the questions which must be
answered by the courts when construing the 1964 Amendment. The answers will
determine to a great extent the future course of the home rule movement in
New York.
DAVID M. BROWN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO ASSIGNED COUNSEL Now AvAIL-
ABLE TO MISDEMEANANTS TRIED IN SPECIAL SESSIONS COURTS
Defendant, a nineteen year old youth, along with two others, was arrested
at an apple orchard in the Town of Ramapo, Rockland County, on September
12, 1961, at approximately 10:30 P.M. while helping himself to half a bushel of
apples valued at about two dollars. The owner of the orchard, having caught one
of the youths in the act, filed an information with the Justice of the Peace charg-
ing the defendants with petit larceny. The defendant appeared before the Justice
of the Peace at a little past midnight that same evening, whereupon he was in-
formed of the charge against him and instructed in the following manner: 1
45. Id. at 217, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
46. See Holland v. Bankson, 290 N.Y. 267, 49 N.E.2d 16 (1943) ; Osborn v. Cohen, 272
N.Y. 55, 4 N.E.2d 289 (1936).
47. Allmendinger v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 142, 46 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
aff'd, 269 App. Div. 691, 54 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1st Dep't 1945), aff'd, 295 N.Y. 644, 64 N.E.2d 712
(1945); Gorman v. City of New York, 304 N.Y. 865, 109 N.E.2d 881 (1952).
1. These proceedings were held pursuant to N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 699.
